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Constituting a Court, Securing a Conviction,  
Creating a Human Right 
 
Debra Bergoffen 
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That rape and sexual enslavement of Muslim women and girls was 
used as an ethnic cleansing strategy by the Bosnian-Serbs in the wars 
in the former Yugoslavia is now well known.   On February 22, 2001 
when the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
the ICTY, convicted three Bosnian-Serb soldiers of crimes against 
humanity for this tactic, its verdict was hailed as groundbreaking.  It 
signaled that the business as usual dismissal of war-time rape as a 
matter of boys being boys or collateral damage was at an end.  Less 
well known are the forces that converged to make this conviction 
possible.  Less discussed are the radical implications of this judgment 
and the promise it holds for uncovering the gender biases of 
international law and challenging them. 
 The February 22, 2001 verdict, in what is known as the 
Kunarac case, was the culmination of a trial that was groundbreaking 
from beginning to end. First was the unique nature of the indictment. 
This was the first war crimes trial that dealt exclusively with rape, 
sexual abuse and sexual enslavement. It was the first indictment that 
clearly distinguished rape from torture. The nature of the proceedings 
was also distinctive.  In addition to defining rape in terms of criteria 
of consent rather than force, so that rape was understood in terms of 
unwanted rather than forced penetration, the Court distinguished 
genuine consent from apparent consent, indicating that the context 
of the situation established whether or not genuine consent was 
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possible.  It noted that situations characterized by power imbalances, 
for example, the relationship between a civilian and a soldier, or 
imbued with threats, for example, terrorizing a civilian population, 
made genuine consent impossible.  It also made the woman's 
experience of what happened to her body rather than the man's 
explanation of what was going on in his mind (I thought her no 
meant yes. I took her silence as consent) the determining factor in 
deciding whether or not a rape occurred.  In this way the Court 
acknowledged the woman's epistemic authority—her right to define 
and bear witness to her experience.  Finally, the verdict.  In finding 
the soldiers guilty the court cited two principles. One principle stated 
that that men of substance do not abuse women. The other cited the 
women's human right to sexual self-determination.  Though the first 
principle is somewhat conservative insofar as it reinforces the 
gendered ideology of men as protectors of women, the second is 
radical—it effectively creates a new human right—the right to sexual 
integrity.  In creating this right it reframes human rights discourses.  
Instead of being invoked to defend the dignity of the invulnerable 
body, a body traditionally gendered male,  they now need to be seen 
as affirming the dignity of the vulnerable body, a body  traditionally 
gendered female. 
 In this piece, I take a closer look at the forces that converged 
to make this groundbreaking judgment possible and, using this case 
as a case study, I consider the radical and promising implications of 
appealing to human rights  to affirm the dignity of the vulnerable 
body. 
 
Constituting a Court 
On May 25, 1993 the UN Security Council, judging that the wars in 
the former Yugoslavia were a threat to international peace and 
security, established the ICTY. The Court was expected to restore 
peace and security by prosecuting violations of established 
international war crimes and humanitarian law and by strengthening 
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existing legal codes.1 Given this expectation and the fact that most of 
the ICTY judges were academics interested in developing 
international law and institutions we might say that the  Kunarac 
indictment, in taking the radical steps of focusing on the gendered 
criminality of the Bosnian-Serb genocide strategy, in reformulating 
the criteria of rape and in creating a human right to sexual self 
determination, did what the Security Council expected it to do.2  
Catherine MacKinnon had high expectations for the Court.  
Speaking at the Yale Law School in April 1994 she declared: “The 
ICTY stands poised to develop an international jurisprudence of 
sexual assault as integral to the law of nations for the first time.”3 She 
based her expectations on the statute that established the ICTY – 
especially on the differences of this statue from those of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo courts.  Unlike these post World War II 
courts whose directives were either silent on the issues of rape and 
forced prostitution, or only saw rape as a species of torture, the ICTY 
statute specifically named rape and forced prostitution as 
prosecutable crimes. Further, Rule 96 of the ICTY statute stipulated 
that no corroboration was required in sexual assaults, that consent 
was not an acceptable defense, and that no evidence of prior sexual 
conduct was admissible.4 MacKinnon also believed that women’s 
demands for accountability played a role in the structuring of the 
court, and that given these demands and the court’s statutes, the 
ICTY had an historic opportunity to identify rape as a human rights 
violation.5 
 Despite their different charges, the Tokyo and Nuremberg 
courts and the ICTY faced similar situations—they were charged 
with prosecuting war-time actions that had yet to be identified as 
criminal in international law. Both courts had to  push the edges of 
                                                 
1 Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise 
in Law Politics and Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3. 
2 Ibid., 34, 95. 
3 Catherine MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 178. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 191. 
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established law to transform the criminality of a national and military 
policy into a punishable international offense. In the case of the 
Nuremburg court, the sovereign right of a nation to deal with its own 
citizens without interference from other states had to be identified as 
a violation of humanitarian law.  In the case of the ICTY, the use of 
rape as a war strategy had to be criminalized as an illegal weapon.  
The Nuremburg court redrew the lines of sovereign immunity. The 
ICTY redefined the crime of rape and in the process of rejecting 
prevalent definitions of rape and sexual assault exposed the gendered 
assumptions and injustices of these definitions. 
 
Securing a Conviction 
Unlike the recently named crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing, 
rape has been a recognized war crime for centuries.  While the crimes 
of genocide and ethnic cleansing needed to be named to become 
legally visible, the legally visible crime of war time rape was rendered 
empirically invisible first by gendered norms of epistemic credibility 
that establish men’s reading of events as objective and rational (thus 
meeting the rational man legal standard) and women’s accounts as 
emotional and suspicious (thus failing to meet the rational legal 
standard of credible evidence); second by masculine myths of 
sexuality that legitimate men’s aggressive sexual behaviors as natural; 
third by myths of femininity that portray women as desiring sexually 
aggressive men; and fourth by unspoken military codes that accept 
rape as a spoil of war.   
Ignoring reports of rape, and calling rape something else 
(collateral damage, consensual sex, letting off steam) are common 
ways of making rape disappear.  Legally, the invisibility of rape is 
aided and abetted by equating rape with torture.  The endurance of 
the tradition that identifies rape with torture relies on several factors: 
men determining the meaning of rape (including the circumstances in 
which sexual intercourse can be called rape);  rules of shame and 
modesty that, in ensuring women’s silence, ensured that men’s 
account of what counts as rape would not be challenged; and ideas of 
violation that measure harm by the standard of the masculine 
4
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autonomous body such that absent cuts, bruises, or wounds, no harm 
can be claimed. 
These extra legal factors led to legal standards that, in 
equating rape with torture, held that a rape could only be said to 
occur if there was evidence of physical violence. This standard of 
rape reduces it to a matter among men. It takes no account of the 
raped woman’s experience of having been abused and violated.  It 
can hold only as long as men’s voices dominate public discourse; as 
long as codes of femininity silence women; and as long as women 
who do speak lack epistemic authority.  The ICTY made the crime of 
rape legally and empirically visible by paying attention to the raped 
women’s experience and challenging the men’s accounts. In its 
sentencing decree, it went so far as to argue that Kunarac’s and 
Kovač’s false defenses, Kunarac’s claim that a nineteen year old girl 
seduced him, and Kovač’s invented account of his relationship with 
Witness #87, constituted aggravating factors and should be 
considered in their punishment. In listening to the women, the Court 
refused to equate the absence of bruises with the absence of abuse.  
It signaled that men’s account of sexual relationships would not go 
uncontested. 
The lawyers defending the soldiers in the Kunarc case relied 
on the equation of rape with torture to argue that the prosecution did 
not prove that the alleged victims of rape were exposed to any severe 
physical or psychological suffering: that rape in itself is not an act that 
inflicts severe bodily pain and therefore that no crime against 
humanity  occurred.6  In effect, the defense argued that if the Court 
wished to include rape in the category of crimes against humanity it 
would have to identify rape with the violence and pain associated 
with torture, and that if the Court defined rape without reference to 
this understanding of violence and pain it could not establish rape as 
a crime against humanity. Given accepted legal definitions of rape 
and crimes against humanity, there was nothing amiss in the defense 
lawyers’ logic. Their argument failed not because the Court rejected 
                                                 
6 Marlise Simons, “Three Serbs Convicted in Wartime Rapes,” New York Times, 22 
Feb. 2001. 
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the defense lawyer’s reasoning but because, attending to the women’s 
accounts of rape, it contested the assumptions of the defense lawyer’s 
arguments.  Listening to the women, it refused to accept the 
traditional understandings of rape, torture and crimes against 
humanity. Without discounting the matter of physical and 
psychological suffering, the Court found that the crucial issue in 
determining whether or not a criminal act rises to the level of  a crime 
against humanity concerns the matter of human dignity. The 
women’s testimonies convinced the Court that sexual integrity and 
human dignity are too tightly intertwined to be separable. Violating 
one violates the other.  
The indictment, in distinguishing rape from torture, should 
have alerted the defense lawyers to the futility of their tactic.  Rather 
than accepting the indictment as a warning against their “rape must 
be the equivalent of torture to be considered a crime against 
humanity”  strategy, however, the defense lawyers challenged the 
validity of the indictment and the objectivity of the judge. This 
becomes clear in their appeal. Here the defense argued that Judge 
Florence Mumba’s prior denunciations of rape and sexual slavery in 
the Balkan war, her previous statements urging a broader definition 
of rape, and her earlier experience as a former representative of 
Zambia to the UN Commission on the Status of Women, tainted her 
ability to be an impartial judge. The Appeals Chamber rejected this 
argument.  It found that Judge Mumba’s experience and insights 
made her uniquely qualified to hear the case. The Appeals Chamber 
recognized that the trial court, first in distinguishing rape from 
torture, second in insisting that reports of rape be thoroughly 
investigated, and third in mandating that those accused of rape and 
sexual slavery face the bench, brought a gendered eye to the evidence 
before it.  It did not, however, find that this gendered eye was 
prejudicial. Instead it found that the Court, in paying attention to the 
dynamics of sex and gender, would take account of realities that a 
“neutral” eye might ignore, and that its judgments would reflect a 
more complete assessment of the situation. 
A gendered eye could see what an “objective” eye would not 
notice: rape, insofar as it is a physical phenomenon, is a crime that 
6
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can be committed by men or women against women and men. In a 
world where one’s gender did not carry cultural and symbolic 
baggage, rape, if it occurred, would be a non-gendered sexual crime. 
In our gendered world, however, rape is predominantly a crime 
committed by men against women. The statistics are clear. In times 
of war, rape is disproportionately a crime committed by military men 
against civilian women. In times of peace it is disproportionately a 
crime committed by men against women. In times of war it cannot 
be adequately addressed through the gender neutral concept of 
torture. This was especially true in the ethnic cleansing campaign in 
the Balkans.  The Bosnian-Serb command ordered the systematic 
rape, not the torture, of Muslim women and girls. 
 To adequately respond to the realities of the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia, the ICTY had to distinguish rape from torture. 
To understand the motives, effects and criminality of the genocide 
rape strategy, the Court needed to be alert to the ways that rape and 
torture, despite their strong family resemblance, constitute different 
violations of our humanity. The distinction between rape and torture 
is twofold.  First, rape, unlike torture is a specific sexual assault. So 
long as rape is considered as a species of torture, we will fail to see 
the ways that our dignity as persons is inexorably tied to our dignity 
as sexual beings. Second, rape, unlike torture, is a gendered and 
symbolic crime. It depends on accepted gender codes both for its 
effectiveness as a military strategy and for the fact that, whether or 
not it is part of an officially ordered policy, rapists expect to be 
immune from prosecution.   
The Bosnian-Serb ethnic cleansing/genocide strategy paid 
attention to the difference between rape and torture.  The men were 
tortured and disappeared or murdered.  The women were raped, 
sexually assaulted, and sometimes, but not always, tortured or 
murdered.  The Court also paid attention to the difference.  It 
distinguished the war crime of torture from the war crime of rape, 
identifying each in its own right as a human rights violation.  Though 
it broke with common practice in its attention to the gendered 
dimensions of the Bosnian-Serb ethnic cleansing campaign, it also 
7
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followed accepted legal principles in noting the gendered realties of 
war time rape as articulated in the Geneva Conventions. 
There is a certain irony in the fact that the Geneva 
Conventions, in providing the precedent for the Court’s gendered 
indictment, also provided the script for using women’s bodies as 
instruments of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Article 75 of Protocol I 
of the Geneva Conventions identifies forced prostitution and 
indecent assault as an outrage on personal dignity, an outrage that 
would apply equally to men and women. Article 76, however, speaks 
of women as deserving special respect.  It says that women in 
particular must be protected against rape and indecent assault, and 
that special protection is owed them and their small children.7 
Articles 27 and 14 of the Geneva Convention are more specific. 
According to Article 27 “Rape, enforced prostitution, e.g. the forcing 
of a woman into immorality by violence or threats and any form of 
indecent assault... are and remain prohibited... and women... have an 
absolute right to respect for their honour and modesty, in short for 
their dignity as women.”8  Article 14 states that women shall be 
treated with all the regard due to their sex. Commenting on Article 
14, Cherif Bassiouni, a member of the commission that established 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, notes that this 
means taking women’s weakness, and the need to protect them into 
consideration.9 
Reading these protocols closely, we see that the meaning of a 
raped woman’s body is not commensurate with the meaning of a 
raped man’s body.  It cannot be understood simply as an indecent 
assault or as an outrage on her personal dignity. Matters of her 
morality, modesty, honour, and weakness, that is, her need for special 
protection, are issues that concern her entire community. A raped 
woman’s body implicates her people, specifically its men, for it is the 
men who are charged with protecting and guaranteeing “their” 
women’s dignity.  Her honour cannot be separated from theirs. 
                                                 
7 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 357-358. 
8 Ibid., 352-353. 
9 Ibid., 356. 
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Raping a woman is an assault on the men of her community.  Her 
raped body is a writing pad upon which men send messages of 
emasculation and hyper masculinity to each other.  
 I think that it is important to see the role that the idea of 
women’s modesty plays in these conventions.  There is an important 
relationship being established between women’s modesty, honour, 
integrity and dignity, and their need to be protected.  In relying on 
traditional rules of modesty to make the case for the special 
criminality of heterosexual rape, the Conventions reflect and 
reinforce traditional gender geographies.  Positioning women as 
needing special attention and identifying the special protection they 
need with the special protection due to children establishes an 
uncomfortable analogy between women and children.  Both need to 
be looked after.  The logic of special protection of women differs 
from the logic of the special protection for children, however, once 
the idea of modesty is introduced.  Women cannot, without 
compromising their modesty or risking their protection and 
reputation, enter the public domain to bear witness to their 
experience.  Her testimony comes at the price of her modesty.  It 
carries the cost of being shamed by her people and becoming 
ashamed of herself. It is not just the fear of losing their protection 
that keeps women from speaking out; it is the shame of having been 
exposed that keeps them silent. Thus the gendered protection racket 
and the fear of being shamed ensure that a woman’s experience of 
rape will be filtered through and defined by the words of men. 
 
Creating a new Human Right 
The court’s finding of guilt is clear.  It establishes that the well worn 
defenses of war-time rape and sexual abuse, are no longer acceptable.  
In rejecting the usual excuses, the court invoked two principles. One 
principle refers to men and their responsibility to women.  It declares 
that, “In time of peace as much as in time of war, men of substance 
do not abuse women.”10  The other principle refers to women and 
their rights. It links women’s dignity to their “fundamental human 
                                                 
10 Simons, “Three Serbs Convicted in Wartime Rapes.” 
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right to sexual self-determination.”11 The man of substance principle 
defers to the traditional gendered idea of women as weak and 
vulnerable.  It accepts the standard meaning of war time rape as a 
violation of women’s unique vulnerability. By finding that men are 
responsible for ensuring that women are not abused this aspect of the 
ruling implicitly reiterates the Geneva Convention’s idea that 
women’s honor and modesty requires special protection.  The second 
principle of the Court’s verdict, the affirmation of the women's 
human right to sexual self-determination, however, is silent on the 
question of women’s honor and modesty and says nothing about 
men’s responsibility to protect women. Between what this principle 
says—women have a right to sexual self determination—and what it 
does not say—men are not held responsible for protecting this 
right—the Court challenges gender codes that legitimate women’s 
vulnerability to men’s power 
In reminding men of their obligation not to abuse women 
and insisting that the conditions of war do not absolve them of this 
obligation, the Court accepts the fact that men can abuse women. It 
positions men as having the obligation to protect women from men’s 
abuse without asking how men acquired the power to abuse women 
and without asking why women need male protection. Whether the 
Court thinks that men’s power to protect women is a matter of 
natural/biological or social factors, it is clear that it expects men of 
substance to protect women from abuse first by disciplining 
themselves (they should not do what they can do, they should not 
abuse women) and then by disciplining other men (they should not 
allow other men to do what men can do).  In a military situation, this 
is a chain of command issue.  Officers are expected to use the power 
of their rank to model the man of substance ideal to those under 
their command.   They are expected to train their men to protect 
civilian women. This includes preventing rape and sexual abuse. In 
                                                 
11 “Judgement of Trial Chamber II in the Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković Case,” The 
Hague, 22 February 2001 JL/P.I.S./566-e, 6; available from 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Kunarac/tjug/en/010222_Kunarac_Kovačc_Vukov
ic_summary_en.pdf. 
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times of peace where there is no chain of command and no military 
discipline to enforce the men of substance rule, it is a matter of 
personal responsibility.  In pointing to the flawed character and 
criminality of men who fail to protect women from other men’s or 
their own aggression, this men of substance principle may be seen as 
deflecting attention from the criminality of gender codes that 
legitimate women’s vulnerability to men’s power. By invoking the 
sexual self-determination principle, however, the Court indicates that 
it is not altogether blind to the fact that patriarchal gender structures 
must be named as an accomplice to the crime of war time rape. By 
speaking of her dignity rather than his responsibility, the sexual self 
determination principle shifts our attention from the perpetrator to 
his victim.  In linking women’s dignity to their “fundamental human 
right to sexual self-determination”, the court rejects the protector-
protected sexual contract.  It affirms the principle of embodied 
subjectivity as it attends to the sexed realities of embodiment, 
something ignored in previous crimes against humanity judgments.12  
 The Court does not claim to be doing anything radical.  It 
acts as though it is merely articulating the obvious fact that sexual 
integrity cannot be severed from human integrity such that an assault 
on one is necessarily an assault on the other.  It does not flag the fact 
that it is only by its judgment that a relationship between sexual and 
human integrity is being established in international law. 
The effects of establishing the human right to sexual self 
determination are difficult to predict. If the idea of self determination 
is allowed to slide into the idea of autonomy, creating a right to 
sexual self determination may have little effect on the autonomous 
subject’s place in human rights discourses. Insofar as the right to 
sexual self determination directs us to think of the self as existing in 
relationship with and vulnerable to others, however, it may get us to 
reassess our love affair with the autonomous subject.  If the newly 
created right to sexual self determination is read as a challenge to the 
way that we have read rights as inhering within individuals rather 
than as existing between them, it will inaugurate a paradigm shift 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
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where the subject of rights, instead of being understood in terms of 
the first person singular autonomous I, will be understood in terms 
of the first person plural corporeal, sexed, intersubjective and 
vulnerable we. 
Given that to have political effects, re-conceiving the subject 
of human rights must engage the discourse of the law, we need to 
return to the ICTY verdict to see how the law can become 
instrumental in advocating a politics of intersubjective embodied  
vulnerability. The Kunarac verdict invokes two distinct ways of 
criminalizing gendered violence.  It  cites the language of individual 
responsibility bequeathed to it by liberal social contract theorists to 
contest the idea of the autonomous subject this language traditionally 
supports.  In creating the human right to sexual self-determination, 
the Court appealed to the familiar language of autonomy to evoke the 
idea of the vulnerable subject. The particulars of the Court’s 
judgment make it clear that the issue of individual responsibility 
weighs heavily in its findings. 
Though the court finds that the rapes were part of a 
systematic campaign to terrorize Muslims in ways that would make it 
impossible for them to return to the region; and though it finds that 
the soldiers knew of the systematic transfer of women to detention 
centers where they were sexually abused; it rejects the claim that the 
defendants were following orders.  In the court’s words, “...the 
evidence shows free will on their part.”13  Struggling to account for 
this free will, the Court notes that the armed conflict offered blanket 
impunity to the perpetrators and called them “lawless 
opportunists.”14  It describes the accused soldiers as morally 
depraved, corrupt men who relished exercising absolute power.  But 
the Court cannot decide whether the conditions of war created the 
opportunity for criminal personalities to flourish or whether war 
itself, in marking certain people as enemies, seduced moral men into 
committing immoral acts.  Thus while it finds that “evidence shows 
the effect a criminal personality will have in war on helpless members 
                                                 
13 Ibid., “Kunarac Summary Judgement,” 2. 
14 Ibid., 3. 
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of the civilian population”, it also notes that, “the three accused are 
men with no criminal past.  However they thrived in the dark 
atmosphere of the dehumanization of those believed to be 
enemies.”15 If the Court cannot decide how to account for the 
unforced behavior of these free willed men, it has no trouble 
categorizing their actions: they are criminal.  In peacetime, the Court 
notes, they would be cited as organized crime.16  
It is, I think, important to note that even when the Court is 
focused on the criminality of the perpetrators, it does not sever their 
culpability from the ways that the structure of war, in dehumanizing 
those identified as enemies, creates favorable conditions for the 
soldiers’ crimes.  While the Court does what the law is charged with 
doing, assessing individual culpability, responsibility and guilt, its 
opinion, in critiquing the discourses of war and enemies, allows us to 
see the ways that the sexual self determination principle situates the 
rights and responsibilities of the individual within their structural 
contexts. 
Though the men of substance principle appears regressive 
insofar as it does not address the structural violence that enables and 
encourages the practice of genocidal rape, the Muslim women’s 
testimonies make it painfully clear that it is by individuals, not social 
forces, that structural violence is perpetrated and suffered. Standing 
alone, the men of substance principle could be seen as limiting the 
function of the law to that of assessing individual culpability, 
responsibility and guilt.  Joined with the right to sexual self 
determination principle, however, the man of substance principle 
positions the law as having the authority to recognize the culpability 
of those who materialize social codes through their individual actions.  
The Court’s verdict does not pit the significance of the 
individual against the importance of established norms.  Rather, it 
appeals to existing norms of responsibility to rework the norms of 
criminality.  Holding individual solders responsible for their actions 
by finding that they failed to respect the sexual integrity, rather than 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 2. 
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the honor, of the raped women, the court transformed the war time 
crime of rape from the violation of the gendered status of a woman 
to the violation of the humanity of vulnerability. The two principles 
of the verdict refer us to the ongoing exchange between anonymous 
social structures and the individual lives structured by them.  They 
show us that unless these structures are critiqued individuals will 
continue to unreflectively reinforce them.  They also show us that 
because it is individuals who give these structures life they can be 
critiqued and changed. Where the men of substance principle alerts 
us to the importance of individual responsibility, the sexual integrity 
principle requires that we critique current ways of assessing who is 
responsible for what. The Court finds the logic of the enemy 
responsible for the Bosnian-Serb soldiers’ abuse of women’s 
vulnerability and invokes the principle of genuine consent to hold 
them accountable for their violence.  The court, in refusing to 
exonerate men, who use the logic of the enemy as a shield for their 
crimes, appeals to two lines of logic to find them guilty of crimes 
against humanity: the logic of gendered protection codes (men of 
substance) and the logic of human rights (sexual self-determination). 
As these logics circle each other, they expose the ways that our 
current gender codes are invitations to genocidal rape campaigns.  
They warn us that those who accept these invitations are guilty of   
crimes against humanity. 
And so it comes/came to this: a Court that brought a 
gendered eye to justice, that used this eye to expose the gendered 
biases of the law, ungendered the stigma of vulnerability and 
introduced us to the ungendered justice of the dignity of the 
vulnerable body. 
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